Workers need to follow rules for claims
Published 02/10/06

For employment discrimination cases, workers need both factual support for their discrimination claims and to follow the procedural parameters in which to assert their claims in order to get their case before a jury. Being part of a minority group does not in and of itself entitle a worker to a jury trial against her former employer.

This point was illustrated in the January 19, 2006 decision of Jai Taal v. Hannaford Bros. Co . In that case, Jai Taal, an African-American woman, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire alleging that her former employer, Hannaford, racially discriminated against her in violation of federal law.

Taal was employed at a grocery store owned by Hannaford from 1995 to 2002. Taal claimed, among other things, that during the course of her employment she was subjected to a hostile work environment.

She alleged that a co-worker placed a stuffed monkey at her work station and after she complained, the department manager replaced the stuffed animal with a picture of herself dressed as a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Taal also alleged that her co-workers referred to her as the "black sheep" and the "beans."

The beans comment allegedly derives from an incident in which Texaco's senior management referred to African American employees as black jelly beans.

While if the above factual allegations were proven at trial, Taal may have won a jury verdict against Hannaford Bros., she filed her claim too late and therefore did not meet the procedural parameters to have that hostile work environment claim brought before a jury.

Taal had two remaining discrimination claims that were not time barred: an unequal pay claim and a failure to promote claim. To meet Taal 's burden under a pay discrimination claim, she would need to show that she is a member of a protected class; performed her job in keeping with her employer's expectations; and that she was paid less than similarly situated workers who held the same position.

Taal alleged that she and other African-American workers were on a different pay scale and job description and made substantially less than other white workers who performed the same, if not less, duties. She also alleged that she was never eligible for the company's cost of living raises.

However, Hannaford was able to show that her pay was consistent with the company's pay scale for part-time workers and that it had increased periodically through the course of her employment. Taal was unable to cite any specific examples of similarly situated workers who held the same position and received higher wages.

The Court noted that even if Taal could establish her burden of proof that there was disparate treatment of her in terms of pay, Hannaford had a legally sufficient explanation that any apparent wage discrepancies were due to the fact that workers who were paid more either held different positions or worked full time. Hannaford used a different pay scale for full-time and part-time workers. Therefore, full-time workers holding the same position as Taal may have received a higher hourly wage.

The Court found that Taal 's attempt to compare herself with workers who do not closely resemble her in all relevant aspects of her job is insufficient to meet her burden of showing that any wage discrepancy was a result of racial animus. Therefore, the Court ruled that Taal could not go forward with a trial on her claim for pay discrimination.

Simply put, a company can have a very legitimate business reason to pay part-time workers doing the same job less than their full-time workers who are obviously more committed to the company by the very nature of their working full time. The mere fact that Taal is part of a racial minority does not give her better rights than any other part-time worker.

The Court in addressing Taal 's claim that she was discriminated against because of Hannaford's failure to promote her was also determined not to have sufficient factual support justifying her to go to trial on that issue.

To prove her failure to promote claim, Taal would had to have shown not only was she a member of a racial minority but that she was qualified for an open position for which she applied but was rejected in favor of someone possessing similar qualifications. The fatal flaw to Taal 's claim was that she conceded that she never applied for any promotion.

While she claimed that Hannaford did not advertise openings for higher positions, she did not present any evidence that she was denied a position in favor of someone who was similarly qualified. Therefore, she did not meet her minimal burden of proving her case that there was a failure to promote.

Taal had also claimed she was treated differently than similarly situated workers in other respects including training and career developments but the Court found that her mere conclusory allegations without factual support did not suffice to prove that there was a disparate treatment of her because of her race.

This decision helps illustrate to employers and workers alike that the mere fact that a person is a part of a protected class such as race, religion, age, or gender does not mean that every adverse action taken against the worker or failure to receive a benefit constitutes illegal discrimination. A worker who believes they are subject to discrimination needs to allege facts that, if proven, would allow a jury to conclude that illegal discrimination had occurred.

For workers, this case also illustrates the importance that if a worker is subjected to discrimination and wants to make a claim against her employer she should promptly speak with an employment attorney to determine whether or not she has a possible claim, the benefits and costs of filing a claim, and when and how such a claim should be filed.

J. Daniel Marr is a director and shareholder at Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A. His legal practice includes counseling businesses and business persons on a variety of legal issues, including employment, and advocating on their behalf. You can reach Attorney Marr by e-mail at: dmarr@hamker.com

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