|

No-Compete
clause can save battle time
Published 08/03/06
As
illustrated in a recent decision from the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, employees have limits on how they compete with their former
employers even absent an agreement governing their post-employment
conduct.
On
July 26, 2006, the Court in the case of Mortgage Specialists,
Inc. v. Joseph C. Davey, IV & a . was faced with an appeal
of a claim by Mortgage Specialists against its former employees
Joseph Davey and Michael Carbone as a result of their taking
and using customer information, allegedly making disparaging remarks,
and solicited current employees of Mortgage Specialists.
In
particular, Davey and Carbone worked as loan originators for Mortgage
Specialists and in July 2002 both left Mortgage Specialists to work
for competitors. When they left, each took with them copies of customer
information retained during the course of their work which they
used to their advantage and to the disadvantage of Mortgage Specialists.
Since
leaving Mortgage Specialists, Davey and Carbone have both closed
loans for customers who previously had business with Mortgage Specialists.
Davey and Carbone did not have any agreement prohibiting the use
of confidential information, competing with their former employers,
or prohibiting the solicitation of former customers or employees.
Therefore, Mortgage Specialists in bringing legal claims against
Davey and Carbone had to rely on legal theories not based on a breach
of contract.
One
of those claims was a violation of New Hampshire 's Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act which prohibits the misappropriation and use of trade
secrets. However, the statute also prohibits making other legal
claims not based on breach of contract which allege misappropriation
of trade secrets, leaving the Act as the only choice for such a
legal claim. Simply put, Mortgage Specialists' allegations that
their former employees stole and used its customer information against
it could only be litigated within the confines of the specific terms
of the Act.
A
requirement of the Act required Mortgage Specialists to have taken
reasonable efforts to maintain the customer information secret in
order to obtain damages from its former employees for misappropriation
of its trade secrets. The jury ruled in favor of Davey and Carbone
in the trade secret claim. The trial court, and then this Court,
upheld the jury verdict finding that a reasonable jury could have
concluded the customer information was not a trade secret because
Mortgage Specialists' customer information was not subject to reasonable
efforts to maintain its secrecy under the circumstances.
While
the evidence presented showed that Mortgage Specialists did take
actions to protect the privacy of its customers, the Court found
that those actions could be presumed by a reasonable juror to be
for the protection of the customers not for the protection of Mortgage
Specialists. The Court in its analysis pointed out the fact that
there was no company employment policy that prohibited the use of
the confidential information obtained from customers to the detriment
of Mortgage Specialists and Davey and Carbone were never required
to sign confidentiality agreements. If Mortgage Specialists had
such a confidential information policy as to the customer information
and secured the customer information so it was accessible only on
a need-to-know basis by employees of Mortgage Specialists doing
their jobs for that company, then the Court may have ruled differently
and supported Mortgage Specialists trade secret claim. Of course,
had Davey and Carbone signed detailed confidentiality agreements
they may not have even dared to take the customer information and
if they did, Mortgage Specialists would have had a much clearer
legal claim to first stop their use of the information through a
court-ordered injunction, and then obtain damages for whatever economic
injury they had caused.
Forcing
an employee to sign a confidentiality agreement merely requires
them to: (a) use only the confidential information of the company
for the benefit of the company; (b) to turn over and not keep any
documents or other things containing confidential information at
the end of their employment; (c) and not use any confidential information
learned during their employment.
While
an employee may object to a non-competition agreement which prohibits
her competing in her job expertise for a time period after she leaves
the company, an employee is generally hard pressed to object to
not using the company's confidential customer or other information
so long as the definition of confidential information is narrowly
defined to information which is truly confidential and proprietary
to the company.
Mortgage
Specialists, in addition to claiming that Davey and Carbone misused
confidential customer information, also claimed they intentionally
contacted Mortgage Specialists customers with whom it claimed an
advantageous relationship and persuaded them to do business with
the defendants and that Carbone informed Mortgage Specialists' customers
that it was not properly licensed in the state. Mortgage Specialists
also alleged that the defendants solicited employees of Mortgage
Specialists. Therefore Mortgage Specialists made out an allegation
sufficient to be able to have a trial on a claim for tortuous interference
with an advantageous relationship.
The
Court also found that Mortgage Specialists could still go forward
with its claim for violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection
Act prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices which prohibits
the use of any unfair method of competition or unfair deceptive
act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce within the
state. Such conduct includes, but is not limited to disparaging
the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading
representations of fact. Mortgage Specialists alleged that Carbone
informed Mortgage Specialists' customers that it was not properly
licensed in the state and therefore alleged sufficient facts to
have a trial on that claim.
In
conclusion, while Davey and Carbone were able to convince a jury
that they were not liable under New Hampshire's Uniform Trade Secret
Act, the Court has sent back down to the trial court other claims
against them which do not rely on their use of customer information
and as such they are not done with this litigation which was actually
initiated shortly after their resigning in July 2002. This approximately
four-year old controversy has obviously had a serious detrimental
affect on all parties in money and time and it is possible that
a clear confidentiality agreement signed as a condition of employment
may have avoided this protracted and costly litigation.
J.
Daniel Marr is a director and shareholder
of Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A. His legal practice includes counseling
businesses and business persons on a variety of legal issues, including
employment, and advocating on their behalf. You can reach Attorney
Marr by e-mail at: dmarr@hamker.com
This information is general
information and may not reflect the most current legal developments,
verdicts or settlements. The information provided should not
be relied upon as an indication of the actual state of the
law or of future developments. The information contained on
the Hamblett & Kerrigan website is for informational purposes
only and does not constitute legal advice. If the information
referenced may be of legal importance to you, you should consult
with an attorney to provide you with legal guidance and opinion
as the the effect of the current law upon your situation. |